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Abstract
This paper re-examines the welfare economics of risk. It singles out a class of criteria, the “ex-
pected equally-distributed equivalent”, as the unique class which avoids serious drawbacks of existing
approaches. Such criteria behave like ex-post criteria when the final statistical distribution of well-
being is known ex ante, and like ex-ante criteria when risk generates no inequality. The paper also
provides a new result on the tension between inequality aversion and respect of individual ex ante
preferences, in the vein of Harsanyi’s aggregation theorem.
Keywords: risk, social welfare, ex ante, ex post, fairness, Harsanyi theorem.
JEL Classification: D63, D71, D81.
1 Introduction
Welfare economics has not yet reached a consensus about how to assess social situations involving risk.
There are three competing approaches. The utilitarian approach maximizes the sum of individual ex-
pected utilities, which is also, identically, the expected value of the sum of utilities. Such identity is
singled out in Harsanyi’s (1955) aggregation theorem, which shows that any criterion that is based on
expected social utility (corresponding to rationality of the evaluation) and on individual expected utilities
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J. Drèze, T. Gajdos, N. Gravel, P. Mongin, A. Trannoy, G. Valletta, J. Weymark, and from discussions with P. Hammond,
A. Harel, G. Laroque, J. Leach, F. Maniquet, S. Orr, M. Otsuka, J. Roemer, A. Voorhoeve, A. Williams, as well as from
reactions from audiences at the LSE, Carlos III (Madrid), GREQAM (Marseilles), PSE (Paris), Osnabrück, NHH (Bergen)
and Hitotsubashi (Tokyo).
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(i.e., obeying the Pareto principle) must be aﬃne in individual utilities.1 The most disturbing feature
of utilitarianism is its indiﬀerence to the distribution of utilities, and many analysts consider this to be
a fatal flaw. But if one wants to introduce preference for equality in the criterion, Harsanyi’s theorem
forces one to make a choice between rationality and Pareto–which is why there are two main contenders.
A first option is “ex-ante egalitarianism” (advocated by Diamond 1967, Epstein and Segal 1992,
among others), which consists in retaining the Pareto principle and applying inequality aversion to the
distribution of individual expected utilities, while dropping the assumption of expected social utility.
This has implications in terms of rationality that appear more problematic than a mere violation of
expected utility. Consider a situation in which an impending climate change will alter the distribution
of well-being on Earth. Suppose that only two scenarios are considered possible. In one scenario, the
extreme latitudes gain and the low latitudes suﬀer, whereas the reverse occurs in the other scenario.
Suppose that in either scenario the distribution of well-being is ultimately much worse than in absence
of climate change. Therefore one is sure that such climate change is harmful. However, if individual
expected utilities are not diminished ex ante, because everyone may gain or lose depending on which
scenario is realized, ex-ante egalitarianism considers that climate change is harmless. This is strange as
the same criterion considers that the change will ultimately be catastrophic.2
The other option is “ex-post egalitarianism” (advocated by Adler and Sanchirico 2006),3 which uses
an inequality averse social welfare function and evaluates prospects in terms of the expected value of social
welfare. Obviously, in view of Harsanyi’s theorem this approach must relax the Pareto principle, and this
is generally defended on the ground that individual expected utilities fail to record the ex-post inequalities
that risk-taking may entail. However, if one takes a standard social welfare function
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui) , where
ϕ is a concave function, the violation of Pareto is extreme and hard to justify, because individual ex-ante
preferences will not be respected even when no inequality arises in any of the possible consequences.
1Hammond (1983) and Broome (1991) have oﬀered additional arguments in favor of this criterion, and made a careful
scrutiny of the scope of this result. See also Weymark (1991, 2005) for a broad examination of Harsanyi’s arguments in
favor of utilitarianism.
2Ex-ante egalitarianism has also been criticized for implying time inconsistency: wouldn’t it be better to always toss
a new coin before giving a prize, as this would restore equality of expected utilities (Myerson 1981, Broome 1984, 1991,
Hammond 1988, 1989)? However, Epstein and Segal (1992) argue that ex-ante egalitarianism can be made dynamically
consistent by letting decisions depend on the past and compute expected utilities at a relevant time only. Once a coin has
been tossed once, there is then no need to do it again.
3 It is also favorably considered and applied in Meyer and Mookherjee (1987), Harel et al. (2005), Otsuka and Voorhoeve
(2007), Roemer (2007).
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Indeed, in absence of inequalities this approach maximizes the expected value of ϕ (ui) instead of ui,
implying a stronger risk aversion than warranted by individual preferences. Can a concern for ex-post
inequalities justify this kind of paternalism in absence of inequalities?
A variant of this option must be mentioned. Proposed by Broome (1991) and Hammond (1983), it
consists in adopting utilitarianism as a formal criterion but with a measure of individual utility which
incorporates the evaluator’s concern for the distribution. This approach is formally elegant, attractive,
and promises to combine inequality aversion and rationality. But how exactly to incorporate inequality
aversion remains to be worked out and some simple ways of doing it make the approach boil down to
ex-post egalitarianism. In this paper, we will retain the standard assumption that individual utilities only
refer to personal situations and that the Pareto principle refers only to personal interests. If this modified
utilitarian approach were the solution, it would emerge from our analysis, together with a specific way of
incorporating distributional concerns. As it turns out, this is not the case.4
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility of a coherent approach that would avoid
the three severe drawbacks which have just been pointed out for each of the three main contenders:
1) the utilitarian indiﬀerence to the distribution of utility; 2) the irrationality displayed by ex-ante
egalitarianism when an option is declared good whereas each of its possible realizations is declared bad;
3) the violation of individual preferences in absence of inequalities as observed for ex-post egalitarianism.
A particular class of criteria will be singled out, which behave like ex-ante criteria when risk does not
generate inequalities and like ex-post criteria otherwise. Such criteria do compute the expected value
of a social welfare function, like ex-post criteria, but the function that is used must take the form of
the “equally distributed equivalent” (Kolm 1968, Atkinson 1970), a classical example being the function
ϕ−1
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui)
¢
.
Having identified the general form of a criterion that jointly satisfies the three requirements, we then
examine how much inequality aversion and how much respect of individual expected utilities is possible
in this approach. We will in particular highlight a special family of criteria which satisfies a relatively
strong version of the Pareto principle and encompasses all possible degrees of inequality aversion. But
we will also uncover that the new approach has a practical drawback, compared to the other approaches,
because it drastically reduces the possibility to make separate evaluations for subpopulations. A critical
4Yet another approach, proposed by Ben Porath et al. (1997) and Gajdos and Maurin (2004), consists in taking a
convex combination of an ex-ante criterion and an ex-post criterion. The problem with this approach is that it adds up the
drawbacks of the two combined criteria.
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example of this issue concerns the present and future generations, whose choices will not aﬀect the past
generations and for which, as pointed out in Blackorby et al. (2005), it would be cumbersome to be forced
to take account of the “utility of the dead” in their decisions. Exploring this problem, a strong form of
Harsanyi’s utilitarian theorem will be obtained. Finally, at the end of the paper the various approaches
are put to work in economic problems of allocation under risk. The new criteria will be shown to behave
reasonably in problems of insurance and value of life.
In summary, the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the model and the main assumptions
are introduced. In Section 3 the key requirements are formally expressed and the main result is derived.
Section 4 focuses on a relatively strong version of the Pareto principle and identifies the subfamily which
obeys it. Section 5 addresses the challenge of the separability of subpopulations in the evaluation. Section
6 examines three short applications to the welfare economics of risk. Section 7 concludes. Appendix A
contains some proofs and checks the tightness of the results. Appendix B explains how the rationality
assumptions used in this paper connect to decision theory.
2 The framework
The framework is as simple as possible for this analysis. The population is finite and fixed, N = {1, ..., n}.
The set of states of the world is finite, S = {1, ...,m} , and the evaluator has a fixed probability vector
π = (πs)s∈S , with
P
s∈S π
s = 1. This probability vector corresponds to the evaluator’s best estimate of
the likelihood of the various states of the world.5 Since what happens in zero-probability states can be
disregarded, we simply assume that πs > 0 for all s ∈ S. Vector inequalities are denoted ≥, >,À .
The evaluator’s problem is to rank prospects U = (Usi )i∈N,s∈S ∈ Rnm, where Usi describes the utility
attained by individual i in state s. Let L ⊆ Rnm denote the relevant set of such prospects over which the
evaluation must be made. The social ordering (i.e., a complete, transitive binary relation) over the set L
is denoted R (with strict preference P and indiﬀerence I).
Let Ui denote (Usi )s∈S and U
s denote (Usi )i∈N . Let [U
s] denote the riskless prospect in which vector
Us occurs in all states of the world. Two subsets of L are worth distinguishing. Lc will denote the subset
of riskless prospects (i.e., Us = U t for all s, t ∈ S); Le will denote the subset of egalitarian prospects (i.e.,
5There is no problem of aggregation of beliefs here, since the evaluator uses his own probability vector in order to
compute expected values. The evaluator’s beliefs may have been influenced by the population beliefs, but we work here
with his fully updated probability vector.
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Ui = Uj for all i, j ∈ N).
The utility numbers Usi are assumed to be fully measurable and interpersonally comparable, and
they may measure any subjective or objective notion of advantage that the evaluator considers relevant
for social evaluation. In particular, it is not necessary for the analysis that they derive from individ-
ual Bernoulli utility functions. However, it is assumed that, for one-person evaluations, the evaluator
considers that the expected value EUi =
P
s∈S π
sUsi correctly measures agent i’s ex-ante interests.
A key assumption here is that for every s ∈ S, the vector Us fully describes the relevant features of
the final situation occurring in state s. This assumption is of paramount importance because it implies
two things. First, the vector Us containing all the relevant information, the social preferences over final
situations need not and must not be state dependent. If Us is deemed better than U 0s, this must be
true independently of the state that is realized, otherwise the state itself would be a piece of information
missing from utilities. This means that Us is deemed better than U 0s in state s if and only if [Us] R [U 0s] .
In other words, there is no need to introduce preferences over final consequences in the model as they are
equivalent to the social ordering R restricted to riskless prospects.
The second implication of the assumption is that if part of the relevant information includes how
the final situation came about or what would have occurred in counterfactual states of the world, such
information has been incorporated in Us. This means that Diamond’s (1967) criticisms against certain
aspects of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism do not apply. Consider his classical example of a two-individual, two-
state problem in which one must decide to give a prize to one individual or to flip a coin. If the utilities
are as in the following tables (with individuals named Ann and Bob and equiprobable states named Heads
and Tails), Diamond argues that U 0 is better than U even though the utilitarian criterion is indiﬀerent.
Note that the utilitarian criterion is not the only one that is indiﬀerent here, as the distribution of utility
that U 0 yields is (4,0) in every state, just as for U. Any ex-post egalitarian criterion will also be indiﬀerent.
U Heads Tails
Ann 4 4
Bob 0 0
U 0 Heads Tails
Ann 4 0
Bob 0 4
If it is preferable to give fair chances to the individuals, however, this can only mean that (4,0) after a
fair lottery is preferable to (4,0) in absence of a lottery. The utility figures do not then contain all the
relevant information. If they contained all the relevant information, then Diamond’s criticism would not
apply. Broome (1984) defends the view that it is possible to incorporate all fairness considerations into
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utilities.6 The readers who do not accept this view may nonetheless take interest in this paper if they
consider that all prospects in the analysis are equally good in terms of fairness. For instance, if U depicts
a prospect after Ann has won the lottery (and Heads and Tails refer to flipping the coin again with no
change in the prize assignment) while U 0 depicts a prospect before the lottery is drawn, it makes a lot of
sense to be indiﬀerent between them.
3 A general solution
We now introduce the three main requirements that R should satisfy. Utilitarianism displays no aversion
to inequality, and we will be interested in the possibility to introduce inequality aversion in the social
ordering. But there is no need to formalize a requirement to that eﬀect in this section.
In contrast, it is important to formalize the two other requirements mentioned in the introduction.
First, unlike ex-ante egalitarianism, the criterion must not at the same time say that a prospect is at
least as good as another and that it produces a worst situation for sure, or that a prospect is better than
another and that it never produces a better situation. This can be written in the form of two dominance
conditions.
Axiom 1 (Weak Dominance) For all U,U 0 ∈ L, one has U RU 0 if for all s ∈ S, [Us] R [U 0s].
Axiom 2 (Strict Dominance) For all U,U 0 ∈ L, one has U P U 0 if for all s ∈ S, [Us] P [U 0s] .
Such dominance conditions are quite familiar in decision theory.7 To see how compelling they are,
imagine an omniscient being who has the same preferences over final consequences as the decision-maker
and knows everything about the state of the world. If the decision-maker could be told which act the
omniscient being would like him to choose, he should obviously follow suit.8 Now, in situations of
6 In the introduction we rejected the idea that individual utility should incorporate distributional concerns because an
explicit solution of the problem of incorporating inequality aversion in the criteria is preferable. The idea of incorporating
lottery fairness into utility is diﬀerent because it refers to “having had the chance of winning”, a purely personal data. (As
suggested in Deschamps and Gevers (1978), expected utility is also a part of final utility when uncertainty is resolved late
in life.) Certainly, one can argue that an explicit solution to the problem of incorporating lottery fairness in the analysis
would also be preferable. This is a project for future research, as mentioned in the conclusion.
7More on how dominance relates to decision theory, and in particular to Savage’s sure-thing principle, can be found in
Appendix B.
8A very basic principle in decision theory is that, if the set of feasible actions is not aﬀected by the acquisition of
information, it is always good to acquire more information. See Savage (1972), Marschak (1954). Drèze (1987) provides
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dominance between two acts, the decision-maker can actually guess the omniscient being’s preference
about these two acts (because it is the same, whatever the true state of the world). Following these
preferences is equivalent to respecting dominance.
Note that it would be much less compelling to require U P U 0 when for all s ∈ S, [Us] R [U 0s] and
[Us] P [U 0s] for some s only. Indeed, in such a case it may be that for the state s that is eventually
realized one has [Us] I [U 0s] . The dominance conditions adopted here only deal with cases in which one
is absolutely sure of the final preference.
Second, unlike ex-post egalitarianism based on a concave social welfare function such as
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui) ,
the criterion must respect individual expected utility in cases in which no inequalities arise. If whatever
the state of the world, perfect equality is obtained, the population is similar to just one person taking a
risk, and it appears compelling to follow the unanimous expected utility of the population in this special
case.
Axiom 3 (Weak Pareto for Equal Risk) For all U,U 0 ∈ Le, one has U P U 0 if for all i ∈ N, EUi >
EU 0i .
This principle, however, sometimes meets skepticism on the ground that when the whole population
takes a risk, bad luck translates into a widespread catastrophe, which should be avoided at all cost.
This idea of “catastrophe avoidance”, however, may appear attractive only when one’s intuition is driven
by the worry that a catastrophe for a particular generation puts the existence of the next generations
at risk.9 No such externality can occur in the framework of this paper, because the population under
consideration is supposed to include all the relevant individuals, including future generations if needed.
The Pareto principle is also compelling for non-risky situations. This is satisfied by all approaches
under consideration in this paper. It is useful to write this requirement formally.
Axiom 4 (Weak Pareto for No Risk) For all U,U 0 ∈ Lc, one has U P U 0 if for all i ∈ N, Ui > U 0i .
A valuable implication of Pareto for No Risk is the existence of an “equally-distributed quasi-
equivalent” (EDQE) function e, as defined in the following lemma.
many examples in which the acquisition of information reduces the set of feasible actions, inducing a negative value of
information. Such examples do not apply to our “evaluator”, and more generally do not question the dominance principle
for the ranking of options.
9Keeney (1980) also emphasizes that catastrophe avoidance implies concentrating risk on some individuals and thereby
goes against the most basic idea of equity in the allocation of risk. See also Fishburn (1984). The approach developed here
concurs with Keeney and opposes the concentration of risk, as shown in Section 6.
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Lemma 1 Let L = Rnm and let R satisfy Weak Pareto for No Risk. For all U ∈ L, all s ∈ S, there is a
unique e (Us) ∈ R such that for all ε ∈ R++,
[Us] P [(e (Us)− ε, ..., e (Us)− ε)] ,
[(e (Us) + ε, ..., e (Us) + ε)] P [Us] .
For all x ∈ R, e(x, ..., x) = x.
Proof. Take Us ∈ Rn. By Weak Pareto for No Risk, the sets {x ∈ R | [Us] P [(x, ..., x)]} and
{x ∈ R | [(x, ..., x)] P [Us]} are not empty. Moreover, necessarily
sup {x ∈ R | [Us] P [(x, ..., x)]} ≤ inf {x ∈ R | [(x, ..., x)] P [Us]} .
Suppose that
sup {x ∈ R | [Us] P [(x, ..., x)]} < inf {x ∈ R | [(x, ..., x)] P [Us]} .
Then let z, z0 ∈ R be such that
sup {x ∈ R | [Us] P [(x, ..., x)]} < z < z0 < inf {x ∈ R | [(x, ..., x)] P [Us]} .
One cannot have [Us] P [(z, ..., z)] or [(z, ..., z)] P [Us] , so that [Us] I [(z, ..., z)] . Similarly,
[Us] I [(z0, ..., z0)] . By transitivity, [(z, ..., z)] I [(z0, ..., z0)] , which contradicts Weak Pareto for No Risk.
As a consequence, one must have
sup {x ∈ R | [Us] P [(x, ..., x)]} = inf {x ∈ R | [(x, ..., x)] P [Us]} .
This defines a function e (Us) , and by definition of sup and inf (and Weak Pareto for No Risk) one
necessarily has, for all ε ∈ R++,
e (Us)− ε ∈ {x ∈ R | [Us] P [(x, ..., x)]} ,
e (Us) + ε ∈ {x ∈ R | [(x, ..., x)] P [Us]} .
It is immediate that for all x ∈ R, e(x, ..., x) = x.
When the social ordering R is continuous, the EDQE becomes the “equally-distributed equivalent”,
a continuous function satisfying, for all Us ∈ Rn,
[Us] I [(e (Us) , ..., e (Us))] .
We can now state a first result, which partly describes how R must be computed in order to satisfy these
axioms.
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Theorem 1 Let L = Rnm and R satisfy Weak or Strict Dominance, Weak Pareto for Equal Risk and
Weak Pareto for No Risk. For all U,U 0 ∈ L, one has U P U 0 if Ps∈S πse (Us) >Ps∈S πse (U 0s) , where
e is the EDQE function defined in Lemma 1.
Proof. Let U,U 0 ∈ L be such that Ps∈S πse (Us) >Ps∈S πse (U 0s) . Let ε ∈ R++ be such thatX
s∈S
πse (Us)− ε >
X
s∈S
πse (U 0s) + ε.
For all s ∈ S, one has
[Us] P [(e (Us)− ε, ..., e (Us)− ε)] ,
[(e (U 0s) + ε, ..., e (U 0s) + ε)] P [U 0s] .
Let e hUi denote the prospect in which every Usi is replaced by e(Us). Let 1 ∈ Rnm be such that for all
i ∈ N, all s ∈ S, 1si = 1. By Weak or Strict Dominance, one has U R e hUi − ε1 and e hU 0i + ε1 R U 0.
One computes, for all i ∈ N
E (e hUi− ε1)i =
X
s∈S
πse (Us)− ε and E (e hU 0i+ ε1)i =
X
s∈S
πse (U 0s) + ε.
As e hUi− ε1,e hU 0i+ ε1 ∈ Le and E (e hUi− ε1) > E (e hU 0i+ ε1) , by Weak Pareto for Equal Risk one
has e hUi− ε1 P e hU 0i+ ε1. By transitivity, U P U 0.
The statement of the theorem becomes an “iﬀ” when the social ordering R is required to be contin-
uous.
A noteworthy feature of this result is that the social criterion must, at least partly, rely on the
expected value of some social welfare function even though the only rationality condition at the social
level is a dominance condition. The expected value comes here from Weak Pareto for Equal Risk, which
is much weaker than standard Pareto requirements but is suﬃcient here to force this result. For further
reference, it is convenient to give a name to the class of criteria covered by this result. Although this is
a little abusive, let us call them “expected equally distributed equivalent” (EEDE).
The classical utilitarian criterion satisfies all the axioms of Theorem 1, and corresponds to the situa-
tion in which e(Us) equals the average utility in Us. But this result is also compatible with incorporating
inequality aversion into R, as developed in the next section. Ex ante egalitarian criteria violate the dom-
inance requirements, while ex-post egalitarian criteria based on concave social welfare functions such asPn
i=1 ϕ (ui) violate Weak Pareto for Equal Risk. In contrast, an ex-post egalitarian criterion based on
the expected value of ϕ−1
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui)
¢
does satisfy all the requirements.
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An EEDE criterion behaves like an ex-ante criterion in absence of ex-post inequalities and like an ex-
post criterion in absence of risk on the final distribution. Let us illustrate it with the ϕ−1
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui)
¢
formula. The expected value of ϕ−1
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui)
¢
behaves like an ex-ante criterion in absence of ex-
post inequalities because ϕ−1
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui)
¢
is then equal to ui, so that its expected value coincides
with individual expected utility. It behaves like an ex-post criterion when the statistical distribution of
final utilities is known, because ϕ−1
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui)
¢
, which is neutral to permutations, then has the same
value in all states of the world, and maximizing it is equivalent to maximizing
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui) .
At this point it is perhaps important to address the potential objection that abandoning the full
Pareto principle is too high a price for the sake of combining dominance and inequality aversion. The
response to this objection is that the full Pareto principle is not compelling when it is applied to expected
utilities as opposed to final utilities. Consider the following prospects.
U 0 Heads Tails
Ann 4 0
Bob 0 4
U 00 Heads Tails
Ann 2 2
Bob 2 2
For both individuals considered in isolation, U 0 and U 00 are equally good ex ante. The Pareto principle
applied to expected utilities would then declare U 0 and U 00 to be equivalent. But as only one state
of the world can be true ex post, a fully informed observer would actually say that U 0 is better for one
individual and worse for another. If the individuals themselves knew the state of the world, they would not
be indiﬀerent between U 0 and U 00, and by applying the Pareto principle to expected utilities the evaluator
only respects their ignorant preferences and does not particularly respect their informed preferences. As
individual informed preferences normally take precedence in welfare economics over preferences based on
ignorance,10 the Pareto principle applied to expected utilities is much less compelling than the Pareto
principle applied to final utilities.11 An ex-post egalitarian criterion that prefers U 00 to U 0 can be justified
on the ground that it gives priority to the informed preferences of the worse-oﬀ (these preferences indeed
10Someone who believes in a truly indeterministic world would oppose describing the informational situation before the
resolution of uncertainty as a situation of “ignorance” in general. It is fair to say, however, that in most practical cases risk
corresponds to ignorance of the relevant facts. Moreover, even in a truly indeterministic situation knowing the final state
of the world by definition involves more information about the final situation, by comparison to which the ex-ante situation
is a situation of ignorance.
11 It is already widely recognized that, when individuals have diﬀerent beliefs, their unanimity over prospects may be
spurious and carries little normative weight. See e.g. Broome (1999, p. 95), or Mongin (2005). But the point here is that
even if all the individuals have the same beliefs about the probabilities of the various possible states of the world, their
ex-ante preferences over prospects do not call for the same respect as their ex-post preferences. Hammond (1981) almost
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rank U 00 above U 0) over the informed preferences of the better-oﬀ (which rank U 0 first) as well as over
the uninformed preferences of both (which are indiﬀerent). The full Pareto principle is therefore not a
serious challenge to the EEDE approach. We will see in Section 5 that there is a weaker version of the
Pareto principle which raises a more serious challenge.
4 A generalized Gini family
This section highlights a particular family of EEDE criteria. It is special because it satisfies a stronger
version of the Pareto principle than Weak Pareto for Equal Risk. This stronger version leaves quite some
room for respecting individual expected utilities in the presence of ex post inequalities. Interestingly, it
is shown here that this is nevertheless compatible with an arbitrarily high degree of inequality aversion.
This section is motivated by the observation that the EEDE approach based on a social welfare
function ϕ−1
¡
1
n
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui)
¢
, for a strictly concave function ϕ, respects individual expected utility only
in cases of perfect equality in every state of the world. This may appear rather restrictive. In this section
we show that the EEDE approach is compatible with a greater scope for the respect of individual expected
utility.
The idea is to extend the application of the Pareto principle from situations of perfect equality
to cases in which the individuals may be arbitrarily unequal but retain the same relative positions in
all states of the world. Let us say that U involves no reranking if for all s, t ∈ S and all i, j ∈ N,¡
Usi − Usj
¢ ¡
U ti − U tj
¢
≥ 0. Let Lnr be the subset of L that contains the prospects involving no reranking.
As Lc ∪ Le ⊆ Lnr, the following axiom encompasses the two cases of riskless prospects and equal risks
that were distinguished in the previous section. Moreover, it introduces the Strong Pareto principle,
which implies social indiﬀerence when all individuals are indiﬀerent and strict social preference when
some individuals are indiﬀerent and some have a strict preference (in terms of expected utility).
Axiom 5 (Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk) For all U,U 0 ∈ Lnr, one has U RU 0 if for all
i ∈ N, EUi ≥ EU 0i ; in addition one has U P U 0 if for some i ∈ N, EUi > EU 0i .
Note that individuals may occupy diﬀerent relative positions in the two prospects U and U 0 mentioned
in this axiom. The no reranking condition applies only across states of the world for each prospect
makes this point when warning that the context of risk makes the Pareto principle more demanding. Among other things
he notes that misperceptions of probabilities by individual agents undermine the Pareto principle. If we consider that we
live in a deterministic world, this problem is very serious–in such a world all probabilistic beliefs are mistaken!
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separately.
We first show that this is compatible with a strong aversion to inequality. Let us introduce a
requirement expressing inequality aversion over individual prospects. Such a condition can just as well
be satisfied by ex-ante and ex-post criteria. When one agent has greater utility than another in all
states of the world, it is not controversial who is the better oﬀ. The axiom defined below is adapted
from Hammond’s (1976) Equity condition. The original axiom is about inequality reduction between two
agents with unequal utilities. We apply the same idea when one agent has greater utility in all states
of the world, and inequality reduction is performed in every state of the world. This axiom requires an
infinite inequality aversion in changes aﬀecting only two individuals.
Axiom 6 (Hammond Equity) For all U,U 0 ∈ L, one has U RU 0 if for some i, j ∈ N,
U 0i À Ui ≥ Uj À U 0j ,
while Uk = U 0k for all k 6= i, j.
We also need a requirement of impartiality across individuals, saying that permutations of individual
prospects do not aﬀect the value of social prospects.
Axiom 7 (Anonymity) For all U,U 0 ∈ L, one has U I U 0 if U 0 diﬀers from U only by permuting the
vectors Ui.
We can now define the ex-post leximin social ordering, which satisfies all of the requirements in-
troduced so far. Let Us(i) denote the utility of ith rank (by increasing order) in vector U
s, and U(i)
denote
³
Us(i)
´
s∈S
The symbol ≥lex denotes the ordinary leximin criterion, which compares two vectors
by comparing the smallest component, and if they are equal it compares the second smallest component,
and so on. The ex-post leximin criterion weakly prefers U to U 0 iﬀ
¡
EU(i)
¢
i∈N ≥
³
EU 0(i)
´
i∈N
.
In other words, this criterion computes the expected value of the utility of ith rank in U , for all i = 1, ..., n,
and applies the standard leximin criterion to such vectors. Note that the utility of ith rank may befall
diﬀerent individuals in diﬀerent states of the world. This criterion is characterized by some of the
requirements introduced in this section and the previous one.
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Theorem 2 Let L = Rnm. The ordering R satisfies Weak Dominance, Strong Pareto for Non Reranking
Risk, Hammond Equity and Anonymity if and only if it is the ex-post leximin criterion. It then also
satisfies Strict Dominance.
Proof. By Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risks, there is an ordering R˜ over Rn such that for all
U,U 0 ∈ Lnr, U RU 0 iﬀ
(EUi)i∈N R˜ (EU
0
i)i∈N .
By Hammond Equity, Anonymity and Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk, this ordering satisfies the
standard Hammond Equity, Anonymity and Strong Pareto properties over n-vectors (these properties
are immediate adaptations to n-vectors of the axioms defined here for prospects). By Hammond (1979,
Th. 4-5), R˜ is then the leximin ordering.
Let U,U 0 ∈ L. Let V, V 0 ∈ Lnr be defined by V si = Us(i) and V 0si = U 0s(i) for all s ∈ S and all
i ∈ N. By Anonymity, for all s ∈ S, [Us] I [V s] and [U 0s] I [V 0s] . Therefore, by Weak Dominance, U I V
and U 0 I V 0. Therefore, U R U 0 iﬀ V R V 0. By Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risks, V R V 0 iﬀ
(EVi)i∈N R˜ (EV
0
i )i∈N , which, by the previous paragraph, holds iﬀ (EVi)i∈N ≥lex (EV 0i )i∈N .
Conversely, all the axioms of the theorem, plus Strict Dominance, are satisfied by the ex-post leximin
criterion.
The utilitarian criterion satisfies all the axioms of this theorem except Hammond Equity. The ex-ante
leximin criterion (i.e., applying the leximin criterion to expected utilities) satisfies all the axioms except
the dominance requirements. It is shown in the appendix that replacing Strong Pareto for Non Reranking
Risk by a weaker requirement taking the form of combining two Strong Pareto axioms, one restricted to
equal risks and one to riskless prospects, would fail to characterize the ex-post leximin criterion.
Let us now turn to the case of finite inequality aversion. An ex-post generalized Gini criterion weakly
prefers U to U 0 iﬀ X
i∈N
αiEU(i) ≥
X
i∈N
αiEU 0(i),
for some fixed parameters (αi)i∈N ∈ Rn++. Inequality aversion is obtained when α1 > ... > αn. The
utilitarian criterion and the ex-post leximin criterion are both on the boundary of the subfamily of
inequality-averse ex-post generalized Gini criteria.
The next result involves a continuity axiom. Continuity is a requirement which, combined with a
Strong Pareto axiom, excludes infinite inequality aversion.
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Axiom 8 (Continuity) Let U,U 0 ∈ L and (U(t))t∈N ∈ LN be such that U(t) → U. If U(t)RU 0 for all
t ∈ N, then U RU 0. If U 0RU(t) for all t ∈ N, then U 0RU.
One then obtains the following characterization.12
Theorem 3 Let L = Rnm. The ordering R satisfies Weak or Strict Dominance, Strong Pareto for Non
Reranking Risk, Anonymity and Continuity if and only if it is an ex-post generalized Gini criterion.
Proof. Strict Dominance, Continuity and Weak Pareto for No Risk (which is implied by Strong Pareto
for Non Reranking Risk) imply Weak Dominance. It is therefore enough to prove the necessity part with
Weak Dominance.
Let e denote the EDQE function associated to R (its existence is proved in Lemma 1). It is immediate
from Th. 1 that, under Continuity, for all U,U 0 ∈ L, U R U 0 iﬀPs∈S πse(Us) ≥Ps∈S πse(U 0s).Moreover
e must then be continuous.
Let C = {u ∈ Rn | u1 ≤ ... ≤ un} , and L0 = Cm. Let U, V ∈ L0 be such that for all i ∈ N,
all s ∈ S, V si = EUi. By Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk, U I V. This is equivalent toP
s∈S π
se(Us) =
P
s∈S π
se(V s). Now, one has
P
s∈S π
se(V s) = e
¡P
s∈S π
sUs
¢
. Therefore, for all
U ∈ L0,
P
s∈S π
se(Us) = e
¡P
s∈S π
sUs
¢
. As the set C is convex, this implies, by Lemma 3 stated
and proved in Appendix A, that e is aﬃne on C. Therefore there is (αi)i∈N ∈ Rn such that for all
U,U 0 ∈ L0, U R U 0 iﬀ
P
i∈N αiEUi ≥
P
i∈N αiEU
0
i . By Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk, αi > 0
for all i ∈ N.
By Weak Dominance and Anonymity, for all U ∈ L, U I ¡U(i)¢i∈N . As ¡U(i)¢i∈N ∈ L0, one then
obtains by transitivity of R that for all U,U 0 ∈ L, U R U 0 iﬀ Pi∈N αiEU(i) ≥Pi∈N αiEU 0(i).
Conversely, all the axioms of the theorem are satisfied by any ex-post generalized Gini criterion.
These results show that there is substantial flexibility, as far as inequality aversion is concerned,
in the class of EEDE criteria, even under Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk. The next section,
however, shows that there are more serious trade-oﬀs if one wants some separability of the evaluation for
subpopulations in the presence of rerankings.
12 In this result inequality aversion is not introduced, but it would be easy to obtain it with a suitable axiom based on
the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer.
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5 The separability challenge
We have seen that the full Pareto principle is not compelling for risky prospects because it caters to
individual uninformed preferences even when it is possible to know what the distribution of informed
preferences will ultimately be, as with the prospects U 0 and U 00 introduced at the end of Section 3. A
particular feature of that example is worth emphasizing. Even though the evaluator has no information
about states of the world, the informational situation is equivalent to perfectly knowing the state of the
world. Indeed, knowledge of the state of the world would add nothing relevant to the evaluation, because
it would only specify the names of the winner and loser, an information that is irrelevant for an impartial
evaluation. Looking at U 0 and U 00, the evaluator knows all that is needed for the evaluation, namely, the
distribution of final utilities: (4, 0) with U 0, (2, 2) with U 00.
Obviously, such knowledge depends on the correlation between individuals across states of the world.
Consider the following prospects, two of which reproduce U 0 and U 00 under diﬀerent names.
V Heads Tails
Ann 2 2
Bob 2 2
V 0 Heads Tails
Ann 4 0
Bob 2 2
V 00 Heads Tails
Ann 4 0
Bob 0 4
V 000 Heads Tails
Ann 4 0
Bob 4 0
In V 00 there is perfect negative correlation, as opposed to V 000 in which there is perfect positive correlation.
The latter prospect provides no information about the final distribution of utilities. This is precisely why
it makes sense to apply the Pareto principle to equal risks and declare V 000 to be as good as V .
These considerations are useful when one turns to another set of issues. An important diﬀerence
between the three main approaches discussed in the introduction and the EEDE approach is that with
the former one can assess the prospects of subpopulations separately before making a global assessment,
whereas the latter imposes a global examination of the population even when only a fraction of the
population considers a change. For instance, utilitarianism, ex-ante egalitarianism based on a social
welfare function
Pn
i=1 ϕ (EUi) and ex-post egalitarianism based on the expected value of a social welfare
function
Pn
i=1 ϕ (ui) will all be indiﬀerent between V
00 and V 000, because the diﬀerence between the two
only concerns Bob, for whom the two prospects are equivalent. In contrast, a typical EEDE criterion will
prefer V 000 to V 00, because the presence of Ann with her specific prospect makes the prospect for Bob in
V 00 look worse, in terms of EDQE, than in V 000. Here again, this lack of separability makes sense because
the informational situation of the evaluator does depend crucially on the correlation between individuals.
Such reasoning makes it sensible to prefer V 000, but also V 0, to V 00. However, there is a problem.
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A typical EEDE criterion (with strict inequality aversion) will also prefer V to V 0, even though one
can hardly say that the evaluator gains any informational advantage from the (null) correlation between
individuals. In V 0, as compared to V, Ann takes a risk alone while Bob keeps the same sure prospect.
Why should the presence of Bob aﬀect the evaluation? Moreover, the EEDE evaluation may depend on
Bob’s level of utility. For instance, if his utility were lower than 0 or greater than 4, the ex-post leximin
criterion would accept the evaluation based on Ann’s sole prospect. Formally, it is easy to understand
why we have such a strong non-separability here. The presence of Bob aﬀects the value of the EDQE in
every state of the world. The problem is that the informational value of the presence of Bob in V 0, in
terms of knowledge of the final distribution of utilities, seems close to zero. The informational arguments
that justify the lack of separability in the comparison of V 000 or V 0 with V 00 seem to fail in the case of V
and V 0.
The problem takes an interesting and somewhat dramatic turn if one thinks of applying the EEDE
approach to real-life cases. In real life, the only part of the population that faces absolutely no risk, like
Bob in V and V 0, is the subgroup of individuals who are already dead at the moment of the evaluation.
It appears problematic if the utility level of the past generations must play a role in the evaluation of
future risks and this has motivated the axiom of “Independence of the Utilities of the Dead” in Blackorby
et al. (2005).13 The EEDE approach applied to the whole population (past, present and future) typically
violates this axiom. An easy way out is to restrict attention to present and future generations in the
evaluation, but it comes at the cost of intertemporal consistency. The evaluation then depends on the
time at which it is made, and this seems a deep rationality failure.
In order to analyze this problem formally, let us formulate an axiom that strengthens Pareto for
Equal Risk by considering cases in which the equal risk is taken by a subgroup of the population while
the rest is unconcerned and faces no risk (like the past generations). For any M ⊆ N, let UM = (Ui)i∈M
and U−M = (Ui)i/∈M .
Axiom 9 (Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk) ∀U,U 0 ∈ Le, ∀V ∈ Lc, ∀M ⊆ N,
(UM , V−M ) P (U 0M , V−M ) if ∀i ∈M, EUi > EU 0i .
This axiom is logically weaker than jointly imposing Weak Pareto for Equal Risk and a separability
axiom saying that unconcerned individuals facing no risk can be ignored in the evaluation, i.e., can be
removed from the population without altering the ranking of two prospects (such an axiom requires a
13See also Bommier and Zuber (2008).
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broader framework in which the social ordering is defined for diﬀerent possible populations).
Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk is violated by EEDE criteria displaying strict aversion to
inequality. Actually, one can see that, under Weak or Strict Dominance, this axiom is incompatible with
the most basic form of inequality aversion, namely, inequality aversion over riskless prospects. Consider
the following prospects, where ε > 0.
V Heads Tails
Ann 2 2
Bob 2 2
V 0 Heads Tails
Ann 4 + ε 0 + ε
Bob 2 2
Z Heads Tails
Ann 3− ε 1− ε
Bob 3− ε 1− ε
By Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk, V 0 is preferred to V and V is preferred to Z. By transitivity,
therefore, V 0 is preferred to Z. However, in the presence of inequality aversion over riskless prospects, for
ε small enough, [Zs] is preferred to [V 0s] for s =Heads,Tails. Therefore, by Weak or Strict Dominance,
Z is at least as good as V 0, a contradiction.
More specifically, if in Theorem 1 one replaces Weak Pareto for Equal Risk by Weak Pareto for Sub-
group Equal Risk, one obtains a partial characterization of weighted utilitarianism, which is, in essence,
much stronger than Harsanyi’s theorem as it involves only a basic rationality condition (dominance) and
a very restricted version of the Pareto principle.14 Before stating the result, the following Lemma must
be noted.
Lemma 2 Let L = Rnm. If R satisfies Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk, then it satisfies Weak
Pareto for No Risk.
Proof. Let U, V ∈ Lc be such that U ¿ V. Let
T (1) = (V1, U2, ..., Un)
T (2) = (V1, V2, U3, ..., Un)
...
T (n− 1) = (V1, V2, ..., Vn−1, Un) .
By Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk, applied to M = {1} , {2} , ..., {n} successively, one has
T (1) P U, T (2) P T (1), and so on, until V P T (n− 1). By transitivity, V P U.
14Variants of Harsanyi’s result without the expected utility hypothesis can also be found in Blackorby et al. (2004),
Chambers and Hayashi (2006), and Fleurbaey (2009). Harsanyi’s theorem was formulated for lotteries. Its adaptation to
state-contingent alternatives has been studied by Blackorby et al. (1999).
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Theorem 4 Let L = Rnm and R satisfy Weak or Strict Dominance, and Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal
Risk. There is α ∈ Rn+ \ {0} such that for all U,U 0 ∈ L, one has U P U 0 if
P
i∈N αiEUi >
P
i∈N αiEU
0
i .
Proof. By Lemma 2, R also satisfies Weak Pareto for No Risk. Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk
implies Weak Pareto for Equal Risk. By Th. 1, there is an EDQE function e such that
P
s∈S π
se (Us) >P
s∈S π
se (U 0s) implies U P U 0.
Take any u ∈ Rn, any i ∈ N and any x, y ∈ R. Define the prospect V by V sj = uj for all j 6= i, all
s ∈ S, V 1i = x and V si = y for all s > 1. For some ε > 0, let the prospect V ⊕ be such that V ⊕si = EVi+ ε
for all s ∈ S and V ⊕j = Vj for all j 6= i; and the prospect V ª be such that V ªsi = EVi − ε for all s ∈ S
and V ªj = Vj for all j 6= i. By Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk, V ⊕ P V P V ª. This implies thatX
s∈S
πse
¡
V ⊕s
¢
≥
X
s∈S
πse (V s) ≥
X
s∈S
πse
¡
V ªs
¢
.
Let f(z) = e(u1, ..., ui−1, z, ui+1, ..., un). The inequalities read
f
¡
π1x+
¡
1− π1
¢
y + ε
¢
≥ π1f (x) +
¡
1− π1
¢
f (y) ≥ f
¡
π1x+
¡
1− π1
¢
y − ε
¢
. (1)
The fact that (1) holds for all x, y ∈ R, ε > 0 implies, by Lemma 4 stated and proved in Appendix A,
that the function f is aﬃne.
In summary, the function e(u) is aﬃne in ui for all i and all (u1, ..., ui−1, ui+1, ..., un). This means
that there exist coeﬃcients αK , for K ⊆ N, such that
e (u) =
X
K⊆N
αK
ÃY
i∈K
ui
!
,
with the convention that
Q
i∈∅ ui = 1. Now, the fact that e(x, ..., x) ≡ x implies that αK = 0 for K such
that |K| 6= 1, and that Pi∈N α{i} = 1. The fact that Ps∈S πse (V ⊕s) ≥ Ps∈S πse (V s) , which is then
equivalent to α{i} (EVi + ε) ≥ α{i}EVi, requires α{i} ≥ 0.
The weakest part of Harsanyi’s utilitarian theorem is the Pareto axiom applied to expected utilities
because, as we have seen, prospects that look good to every individual separately may be ultimately bad
for some of them for sure. It is harder to reject Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk because it is
immune to this objection. The risk taken by the subgroup depicted in the axiom will be good or bad for
all of them and no certain information about the final distribution is available ex ante. If present and
future generations want to take a risk that may create inequalities only with respect to the (unconcerned)
past generations, who is entitled to declare it a bad move? Theorem 4 is therefore a quite serious challenge
to the EEDE approach and to inequality aversion in general.
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One might think of avoiding the conclusion of this theorem by considering a restricted domain in
which the unconcerned individuals in the application of Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk can only be
the first generations up to some generation, for a fixed order of generations. Unfortunately, this restricted
domain still carries the result that inequality aversion across generations is excluded.15
There is probably no easy answer to this challenge. But four considerations may attenuate it some-
what. First, it is actually not counterintuitive to worry about inequalities involving past generations.
For an EEDE criterion the problem, really, is not that future generations may turn out to be lucky and
be much better oﬀ than past generations. For the family of criteria analyzed in Section 4, for instance,
provided the future generations are better oﬀ than their ancestors in all states of the world they can take
all the risk they want. A problem appears only if in case of bad luck they may end up worse oﬀ than past
generations, a perspective that, indeed, looks intuitively ominous. The application of an EEDE criterion
would then typically imply taking precautions so that the risks taken by present and future generations
do not put them at risk at falling below the utility of their ancestors. Far from being counterintuitive,
this is actually strikingly similar to sustainability principles that have become fashionable recently.
Second, even if the kind of risk depicted in Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk does not make
it possible for an observer to know what the final distribution will be, the presence of the unconcerned
individuals does bring some information. Consider for instance the ex-post leximin criterion. In a two-
agent society the presence of a moderately well-oﬀ unconcerned individual makes it problematic for the
other individual to take a risk that could bring him either above or below the first one. This is because
this risk may lower the utility of the worst-oﬀ and it is not compensated by possible gains because the
gains accrue to the best-oﬀ and are therefore of lesser social value. The evaluator is then sure that the
utility level of the worst-oﬀ cannot be above the utility level of the unconcerned individual, and there
15To see this, consider a simple domain with three generations and only one individual per generation, with i = 1, 2, 3
corresponding to the historical order of succession. A similar argument as in the proof implies that e(u1, u2, u3) must be
aﬃne in u3, in u2 when u2 = u3, and in u1 when u1 = u2 = u3. One must then have
e(u1, u2, u3) = α (u1, u2)u3 + β (u1, u2) .
As this expression must be aﬃne in u2 when u2 = u3, α (u1, u2) must be constant in u2. One then has:
e(u1, u2, u3) = α (u1)u3 + β (u1)u2 + γ (u1) .
By a similar argument, α (u1) and β (u1) must be constant, and one gets
e(u1, u2, u3) = αu3 + βu2 + γu1 + δ.
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is a positive probability that it may fall below. This information about the distribution is ignored by
an isolated individual who only looks at his own personal gains and losses. In conclusion, Weak Pareto
for Subgroup Equal Risk may be criticized on similar grounds as the stronger Pareto axioms because it
requires ignoring some potentially relevant information about the distribution.
Third, consider the alternative strategy consisting in applying an EEDE criterion on present and
future generations only, ignoring past generations. Such a strategy is unlikely to generate much time
inconsistency in practice. A serious inconsistency would involve precise contingent plans that would
involve choices aﬀecting only future generations. There are very few such situations, as in most contexts
of decision the alternatives under consideration are not neutral for the present generation. In sum, whether
one decides to include or not to include past generations in the computation of an EEDE criterion, the
consequences are unlikely to be shocking.
Finally, it must be emphasized that we are dealing here with evaluations, not with decisions made in
specific feasible sets. It may be that risk taking creates regrettable inequalities but that it would be even
worse, given realistic feasibility constraints, to prevent individuals from doing what they want. If the
choice is not between happy risk taking and happy equality but between happy risk taking and miserable
equality, an inequality averse EEDE criterion may well prefer the former.
6 Welfare economics of risk
In this section we illustrate the various approaches in three examples of welfare analysis in the presence
of risk.
Limits of the second welfare theorem. The second welfare theorem says that under certain
conditions, any Pareto eﬃcient allocation can be obtained as a competitive equilibrium with suitable
initial endowments. It is often remembered as meaning that the socially optimal allocation can be
implemented by competitive markets, under ideal conditions. This particular formulation is no longer
valid if the socially optimal allocation is not Pareto eﬃcient. This does occur in particular when ex post
social optimality and ex ante Pareto eﬃciency fall apart, a common situation in the presence of risk.
Here is an example.
Consider a continuum of individuals whose common utility function is U(c, h), where c ≥ 0 is
consumption and h ∈ [0, 1] is health. The distribution of h is known ex ante, but each individual faces a
lottery on h. The socially optimal allocation of c, given the distribution of h, is computed as the solution
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c(h) of the problem
max
Z 1
0
ϕ (U(c(h), h)) f(h)dh s.t.
Z 1
0
c(h)f(h)dh = C.
This is what the standard ex post approach, but also the EEDE approach, would recommend in connection
with an additively separable social welfare function. In contrast, an individual facing an equal chance
of having the health of anyone in the population, and facing an actuarially fair insurance, would seek to
maximize his expected utility:
max
Z 1
0
U(c(h), h)f(h)dh s.t.
Z 1
0
c(h)f(h)dh = C.
The two solutions coincide only if ϕ is aﬃne, i.e., if the social welfare function displays no aversion to
inequality. If ϕ is strictly concave, the socially optimal allocation cannot be implemented by insurance
markets. For instance, if U(c, h) = lnhc, individuals do not want to insure against health shocks because
the marginal utility of consumption does not depend on health. But ex post those who have bad health
wish they had taken an insurance, and the socially optimal allocation would provide them with some
compensation.16 If U(c, h) = hv(c), a function similar to that used in Murphy and Topel (2006), indi-
viduals want to consume more when they are healthy because their marginal utility of consumption is
greater then. In the market they would then take contracts that would reduce their consumption when
their health is bad, which may go in the opposite direction from the socially optimal redistribution if the
social welfare function is suﬃciently averse to inequality.17
Adverse selection and inequalities. Consider the classical adverse selection problem with high
and low risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Wilson 1977, Dahlby 1981). The literature has focused on
the fact that a small amount of compulsory insurance may be Pareto-improving. What happens is that
some compulsory insurance at the pooling indemnity-premium ratio relaxes the temptation for high-risk
agents to mimic the low-risk agents, so that the latter can obtain a better coverage while subsidizing the
former through the compulsory part of the insurance. From the ex-post viewpoint, however, this is not
a Pareto-improvement. Fortunately, the only agents who suﬀer from this policy are the lucky low-risk
agents, who are better-oﬀ than the unlucky low-risk agents and also better-oﬀ than the high-risk agents
if their initial wealth is identical. This is illustrated on Figure 1, where compulsory insurance makes the
high-risk agents move from HR1 to HR2 and the low-risk agents move from LR1 to LR2 (the point NI
16A study of the optimal mix of public and private health insurance when U(c, h) = h + v(c) is made in Leach (2008),
following an ex-post approach compatible with EEDE.
17 It is known since Cook and Graham (1977) that state-dependent utilities may imply puzzling consequences. Contrary
to the standard case, insurance may widen ex-post inequalities, the unlucky having acted against their ex-post interests.
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corresponds to consumption in absence of insurance). The arrow on the figure shows the decrease of
consumption of lucky low-risk agents.
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Figure 1: Introducing compulsory partial insurance
Consider now the case in which the low-risk agents are much poorer than the high-risk agents.
Assume that wealth is private information and cannot be used to discriminate in the insurance system.
If the proportion of high-risk agents is great enough, a complete compulsory insurance at the pooling
indemnity-premium ratio would decrease the expected utility of the low-risk agents and raise the utility
of the high-risk agents, in comparison with the market equilibrium. See Figure 2. An ex-ante egalitarian
criterion would then reject this policy because the low-risk agents are ex ante the worst-oﬀ. From the ex
post viewpoint, things look diﬀerent. This full insurance policy increases the final utility of all high-risk
agents but also of unlucky low-risk agents, and the only losers are, once again, the lucky low-risk agents.
As the unlucky low-risk agents are the worst-oﬀ in the final distribution, a suﬃciently inequality averse
ex post criterion (EEDE or standard) would approve this policy.
Value of life. The two previous examples share the feature that the final distribution is known ex
ante, which makes the standard ex-post approach and the EEDE coincide. Here is an example showing
their diﬀerence. Suppose that individual i’s lifetime utility is U(wi(li), li), where li is longevity and wi(li)
is wealth (which is influenced by longevity). Let ai denote i’s current age. There is a finite number of
individuals. We are interested in a particular hazard, which will strike with probability p. If it strikes,
the joint distribution of longevity l = (li)i∈N is described by a probability density function f(l). If it does
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Figure 2: Introducing compulsory full insurance when low-risk agents are poorer
not strike, the distribution is described by a more favorable function g(l). Let fi(li) and gi(li) denote the
probability density functions of the marginal distribution of li. The problem is to compute the value of
reducing p. To make the comparison easier, let all the criteria be based on the additively separable social
welfare function
Pn
i=1 ϕ(ui).
An ex-ante criterion18 computes the derivative of social welfare with respect to −p as:
nX
i=1
ϕ0 (EUi)
Z +∞
ai
U (wi(li), li) [gi(li)− fi(li)] dli. (2)
A standard ex-post criterion computes it as:
nX
i=1
Z +∞
ai
ϕ (U (wi(li), li)) [gi(li)− fi(li)] dli. (3)
The EEDE criterion computes it as:Z +∞
a1
...
Z +∞
an
ϕ−1
Ã
1
n
nX
i=1
ϕ (U (wi(li), li))
!
[g(l)− f(l)] dln...dl1. (4)
18The ex-ante approach, often without inequality aversion (i.e., utilitarianism), is widely used in this context. See, e.g.,
Viscusi (1992), Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996).
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Consider a simple case. If it hits, the hazard may kill only two individuals j and k, each with
probability 1/2. If it does not hit they live until a fixed L. Formula (2) becomes
1
2
ϕ0 (EUj) [U (wj(L), L)− U (wj(aj), aj)] +
1
2
ϕ0 (EUk) [U (wk(L), L)− U (wk(ak), ak)] ,
where EUi denotes the expected value of U (wi(li), li) , while formula (3) becomes
1
2
[ϕ (U (wj(L), L))− ϕ (U (wj(aj), aj))] +
1
2
[ϕ (U (wk(L), L))− ϕ (U (wk(ak), ak))] .
In contrast, the EEDE criterion needs more information than the marginal distributions. Let us distin-
guish three interesting cases: 1) if the hazard hits, one of the two individuals is killed for sure, but only
one; 2) they face independent risks of dying with probability 1/2; 3) either both dies, or both survive,
with probability 1/2. The EEDE criterion also needs to know what the others’ situation is, but let us
assume for simplicity that their longevity is L for sure and that all individuals have the same wealth
function w(l). Let us moreover assume that aj = ak. Formula (4) becomes, in the three cases:
1) U (w(L), L)− ϕ−1
µ
1
n
[(n− 1)ϕ (U (w(L), L)) + ϕ (U (w(a), a))]
¶
;
2)
1
2
∙
U (w(L), L)− ϕ−1
µ
1
n
[(n− 1)ϕ (U (w(L), L)) + ϕ (U (w(a), a))]
¶¸
+
1
4
∙
U (w(L), L)− ϕ−1
µ
1
n
[(n− 2)ϕ (U (w(L), L)) + 2ϕ (U (w(a), a))]
¶¸
;
3)
1
2
∙
U (w(L), L)− ϕ−1
µ
1
n
[(n− 2)ϕ (U (w(L), L)) + 2ϕ (U (w(a), a))]
¶¸
.
If ϕ is strictly concave, the first expression is greater than the second, which is greater than the third.
It is then more important to reduce a risk that condemns one (yet unknown) individual for sure than
an independent risk, and more important to reduce an independent risk than a risk that hits everyone
equally, when the expected number of casualties is the same in all three cases. It is especially intuitive that
hazards that kill for sure are less acceptable than hazards with a good probability to avoid casualties,19
and it is problematic that the ex-ante criteria and the standard ex-post criteria are insensitive to this.
7 Conclusion
This paper has introduced the EEDE class of criteria and shown that it uniquely avoids serious short-
comings of existing approaches, namely, the utilitarian indiﬀerence to inequalities in utility, the ex-ante
19 It is less intuitive that hazards that kill everybody if they kill at all are more acceptable than independent risks, but
only because of the illusion of “catastrophe avoidance” that was discussed in Section 3. Observe that such hazards minimize
the probability of having casualties.
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egalitarian violations of dominance, and the total disrespect, with standard ex-post egalitarian criteria, of
individual expected utility. The ex-post generalized Gini family, extended to include the ex-post leximin
criterion, has been highlighted in virtue of the fact that it respects individual expected utility in a rather
broad set of cases. But the EEDE approach has also been shown to require dropping an advantageous
feature of the three existing approaches, namely, the possibility to evaluate the prospects of subpopula-
tions separately. Although the previous section has argued that this aspect of the EEDE approach may
not be as problematic as it seems, it has presented a variant of the Harsanyi utilitarian theorem which
signals a serious tension between inequality aversion, rationality of the evaluation, and the neglect of
subpopulations that are not concerned and face no risk.
This paper has not proposed a full theory of social evaluation under risk. Let us briefly mention
three topics which would deserve in-depth explorations. First, there is Diamond’s objection to the ex-
post approach, already discussed in Section 2. It has been put aside in this paper by assuming that
final consequences contained a full description of the relevant information, including about the fairness of
lotteries. But a full theory should obviously make it possible to formulate fairness requirements explicitly
and to derive the restrictions that they impose on the evaluation. This is left for future research.
A second important topic is personal responsibility for risk-taking. Hammond (1983) and Kolm
(1998) suggest that one might associate the principle of respecting individual preferences over risk with
the idea that individuals have the right to take risks and should be able to assume the consequences.
The ex-ante Pareto principle would then be based on an attribution of responsibility to individual agents
for their risk-taking choices. This appears intuitive but, as a matter of fact, assigning responsibility to
individuals generally means that the variables of responsibility are disregarded in the evaluation. For
instance, if the consumer is responsible for what he buys, his situation will be evaluated in terms of
budget set, not in terms of consumption vector. In the context of risk, an individual’s ex-post utility
presumably depends on his expected utility and his luck. Now, the individual’s decisions or attitude to
risk, for which he may be held responsible, can determine his expected utility, but not his luck, which by
definition is neither under his control nor a part of his attitude to risk. Therefore, if anything should be
disregarded in the evaluation in virtue of responsibility, it is the individual’s expected utility, not his luck.
This does not go in the direction of the ex-ante approach which focuses exclusively on expected utility
and disregards individual luck. At any rate, certainly, incorporating notions of personal responsibility for
risk-taking should be an important chapter of a full theory.20
20More on this topic can be found in Fleurbaey (2008, ch. 6). Whether, for the EEDE approach, redistribution should
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A third topic has to do with the application of the EEDE approach to economic models. The
framework adopted in this paper is simple but it involves an assumption that may not be satisfactory
in more concrete analyses, namely, the assumption that interpersonal comparisons and expected utilities
are computed with the same utility measure. It is common, for instance, in the economic theory of fair
allocation to compare individual situations in terms of resources rather than utilities. It would therefore
be interesting to extend the EEDE approach to cases in which interpersonal comparisons are based on a
diﬀerent measure. This is again left for future research.
As most of the welfare economics of risk and insurance adopts the ex-ante viewpoint, this analysis
suggests that it would be worthwhile reexamining policy issues in this field in the light of EEDE criteria.
The examples provided in the previous section have only shown that new criteria may indeed make a
diﬀerence. In a time in which global (e.g., climate change, pandemics) and local (e.g., unhealthy lifestyles)
risks combining various degrees of correlation across subpopulations are the focus of much attention, this
seems an important alley of research.
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Appendix A: Additional proofs
Let πˆ be an arbitrary positive probability vector that diﬀers from π.
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Theorem 1: We check that no axiom is redundant by exhibiting an example that satisfies all the axioms
but one.
• Drop Weak and Strict Dominance. Let R1 be defined by U R1 U 0 iﬀ mini∈N EUi ≥ mini∈N EU 0i .
• Drop Weak Pareto for Equal Risk. Let R2 be defined by U R2 U 0 iﬀ
P
i∈N
P
s∈S πˆ
sUsi ≥P
i∈N
P
s∈S πˆ
sU 0si for some arbitrary πˆ that diﬀers from π.
• Drop Weak Pareto for No Risk. Let R3 be defined by U R3 U 0 iﬀ either U 0 /∈ Le or U,U 0 ∈ Le and
EU1 ≥ EU 01. Note that for R3 no unequal Us has an EDQE.
Theorem 2: We check that no axiom is redundant and also test some possible weakenings.
• Drop Weak Dominance. Let R4 be defined by U R4 U 0 iﬀ (EUi)i∈N ≥lex (EU 0i)i∈N .
• Replace Weak Dominance by Strict Dominance: Let Rlex denote the ex-post leximin criterion, and
R5 be defined by U R5 U 0 iﬀ either U P lex U 0 or U I lex U 0 and U 0 ∈ Lnr.
• Drop Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk. Let R6 be the ex-post leximin criterion based on some
arbitrary πˆ that diﬀers from π.
• Replace Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk by Strong Pareto for Equal Risks and Strong Pareto
for No Risk, which are defined as follows:
Axiom (Strong Pareto for Equal Risk) For all U,U 0 ∈ Le, one has U RU 0 if for all i ∈ N,
EUi ≥ EU 0i ; one has U P U 0 if in addition, for some i ∈ N, EUi > EU 0i .
Axiom (Strong Pareto for No Risk) For all U,U 0 ∈ Lc, one has U RU 0 if for all i ∈ N,
Ui ≥ U 0i ; one has U P U 0 if in addition, for some i ∈ N, Ui > U 0i .
Let (zi(U))i∈N be defined by
z1(U) =
X
s∈S
πsUs(1),
zi+1(U) = zi(U) +
X
s∈S
πˆs
³
Us(i+1) − Us(i)
´
for i = 1, ..., n− 1.
Let R7 be defined by U R7 U 0 iﬀ (zi(U))i∈N ≥lex (zi(U 0))i∈N .
• Drop Hammond Equity. Classical utilitarianism is a counterexample.
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• Drop Anonymity. Let ≥lexico denote the lexicographic criterion that compares the first component
of vectors, and then the second component, and so on. Let R8 defined by U R8 U 0 iﬀÃX
s∈S
πsUs(i)
!
i∈N
>lex
ÃX
s∈S
πsU 0s(i)
!
i∈N
or
ÃX
s∈S
πsUs(i)
!
i∈N
=lex
ÃX
s∈S
πsU 0s(i)
!
i∈N
and (EUi)i∈N ≥lexico (EU 0i)i∈N .
Lemma 3 Let C be a convex subset of Rn and f : C → R satisfy: for all
¡
x1, ..., xm
¢
∈ Cm,
f
ÃX
s∈S
πsxs
!
=
X
s∈S
πsf (xs) .
Then f is aﬃne.
Proof. Let us restrict attention to vectors
¡
x1, ..., xm
¢
∈ Cm such that x2 = ... = xm. One then has, for
all x, y ∈ C,
f(π1x+
¡
1− π1
¢
y) = π1f(x) +
¡
1− π1
¢
f(y).
Let λ ∈ (0, 1) and z = λx + (1− λ) y. One constructs a sequence in C that converges to z as follows:
s1 = x, s2 = y, s3 = π1x +
¡
1− π1
¢
y, and for t ≥ 4, st = π1s∗t +
¡
1− π1
¢
s∗∗t , where s∗t and s∗∗t are
the two adjacent members of {s1, ..., st−1} such that z belongs to the line segment joining them. As f is
continuous, f(st) tends to f(z).
Assume that up to t − 1, writing sk = αkx + (1− αk) y one has f(sk) = αkf(x) + (1− αk) f(y).
This is true for t = 4. Writing s∗t = α∗tx + (1− α∗t ) y, s∗∗t = α∗∗t x + (1− α∗∗t ) y, one then has f(s∗t ) =
α∗t f(x) + (1− α∗t ) f(y), f(s∗∗t ) = α∗∗t f(x) + (1− α∗∗t ) f(y) and
f(st) = π1f(s∗t ) +
¡
1− π1
¢
f(s∗∗t )
= π1 [α∗t f(x) + (1− α∗t ) f(y)] +
¡
1− π1
¢
[α∗∗t f(x) + (1− α∗∗t ) f(y)]
=
£
π1α∗t +
¡
1− π1
¢
α∗∗t
¤
f(x) +
£
π1 (1− α∗t ) +
¡
1− π1
¢
(1− α∗∗t )
¤
f(y).
As one has st = αtx + (1− αt) y for αt = π1α∗t +
¡
1− π1
¢
α∗∗t , this shows that f(st) = αtf(x) +
(1− αt) f(y).
The fact that st tends to z implies that αt tends to λ, and one obtains that f(z) = λf(x) +
(1− λ) f(y). By Coulhon and Mongin (1989, Lemma, p. 183), this implies that f is aﬃne.
Theorem 3: We check that no axiom is redundant and also test a possible weakening.
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• Drop Weak or Strict Dominance. Let R9 be defined by U R9 U 0 iﬀ
P
i∈N ϕ (EUi) ≥
P
i∈N ϕ (EU
0
i) ,
where ϕ is an increasing, continuous, strictly concave function.
• Drop Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk. Let R11 be an ex-post generalized Gini criterion based
on some arbitrary πˆ that diﬀers from π.
• Replace Strong Pareto for Non Reranking Risk by Strong Pareto for Equal Risks and Strong Pareto
for No Risk. Let R12 be defined by U R12 U 0 iﬀ
P
i∈N (n − i)zi(U) ≥
P
i∈N (n − i)zi(U 0), where
zi(U) has been introduced in the definition of R7.
• Drop Anonymity. Let R13 defined by U R13 U 0 iﬀ
P
i∈N (n− i)EUi >
P
i∈N (n− i)EU 0i .
• Drop Continuity. Take Rlex.
Lemma 4 Let f : R→ R satisfy: there is α ∈ (0, 1) such that for all x, y ∈ R, all ε > 0,
f (αx+ (1− α) y + ε) ≥ αf(x) + (1− α) f(y) ≥ f (αx+ (1− α) y − ε) .
Then f is aﬃne.
Proof. Let g = f − f(0). Letting y = 0, one obtains
f (αx+ ε) ≥ αf(x) + (1− α) f(0) ≥ f (αx− ε) ,
f (αx+ ε)− f(0) ≥ α (f(x)− f(0)) ≥ f (αx− ε)− f(0),
g (αx+ ε) ≥ αg(x) ≥ g (αx− ε) ,
and similarly, one has
g ((1− α)x+ ε) ≥ (1− α) g(x) ≥ g ((1− α)x− ε) .
Letting u = αx, v = (1− α) y, one writes
f (u+ v + ε)− f(0) ≥ α (f(x)− f(0)) + (1− α) (f(y)− f(0)) ,
g (u+ v + ε) ≥ αg(x) + (1− α) g(y),
and, as for all ε > 0 one has αg(x) ≥ g (αx− ε) , (1− α) g(x) ≥ g ((1− α)x− ε) , one therefore has for
all η1, η2 > 0
αg(x) + (1− α) g(y) ≥ g (u− η1) + g (v − η2) ,
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implying
g (u+ v + ε) ≥ g (u− η1) + g (v − η2) .
Similarly,
g (u+ v − ε) ≤ g (u+ η1) + g (v + η2) .
Letting a = u+ ε/2, b = v + ε/2, δi = ηi + ε/2, one obtains that for all a, b ∈ R and δ1, δ2 > 0,
g (a+ b) ≥ g (a− δ1) + g (b− δ2) ,
and letting a = u− ε/2, b = v − ε/2, δi = ηi + ε/2, one obtains for all a, b ∈ R and δ1, δ2 > 0,
g (a+ b) ≤ g (a+ δ1) + g (b+ δ2) .
Letting a−δ1 = b−δ2 = z, one sees that g(z) ≤ g(z+ε) for all z ∈ R and ε > 0. That is, g is nondecreasing.
Therefore it has at most a countable number of discontinuity points. At all points x, y ∈ R where it is
continuous, one has
g(x+ y) = g(x) + g(y). (5)
Suppose that g is not continuous and let u be a point of discontinuity, i.e., such that g(u−) < g(u+).
As g is nondecreasing, this means that there is no x such that g(x) ∈ (g(u−), g(u+)) . For all a, b close
enough to u and such that a < u < b, one has (g(a) + g(b)) /2 ∈ (g(u−), g(u+)) . Therefore, there must
be p < p0 < u < q < q0 such that g is continuous at p, q, p0, q0 and (g(p) + g(q)) /2, (g(p0) + g(q0)) /2 ∈
(g(u−), g(u+)) . Let t ∈ ((p+ q) /2, (p0 + q0) /2) be a point where g is continuous. By (5) one has g(2t) =
2g(t) and by (5) and the fact that g is nondecreasing, one has
g(p) + g(q) = g(p+ q) ≤ g(2t) ≤ g(p0 + q0) = g(p0) + g(q0).
Dividing by 2, one obtains
g(p) + g(q)
2
≤ g(t) ≤ g(p
0) + g(q0)
2
,
implying that g(t) ∈ (g(u−), g(u+)) , a contradiction. Therefore g is continuous.
This implies that g satisfies Cauchy’s equation (5) for all x, y ∈ R and, being continuous, is therefore
linear, implying that f is aﬃne.
Theorem 4: We check that no axiom is redundant.
• Drop Weak and Strict Dominance. Take R1.
• Drop Weak Pareto for Subgroup Equal Risk. Take R2.
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Appendix B: Dominance and the sure-thing principle
In decision theory, Weak Dominance is often called “monotonicity” (Anscombe and Aumann 1963) or
“statewise dominance” (Quiggin 1989). It is worth clarifying the relation between statewise dominance
and the sure-thing principle because the latter is often confused with a separability condition. In Savage’s
theory (Savage 1972), an act f is a function that associates every state of the world s ∈ S with a
consequence f(s). Savage defines the sure-thing principle as follows. Take any arbitrary event E (i.e., a
subset of the set S of states of the world). If the decision-maker weakly prefers act f to act g conditionally
on event E being realized, and also conditionally on event E not being realized, then he must weakly
prefer f to g. If a businessman considers it worthy to buy a piece of property on the assumption that the
Democrats win the next election, and also considers it worthy on the assumption that the Republicans
win, then he should buy it. Savage writes that he knows of “no other extralogical principle governing
decisions that finds such ready acceptance” (p. 21).
Statewise dominance is weaker than the sure-thing principle because it applies only in the case when,
for all s ∈ S, the decision-maker weakly prefers f to g conditionally on the singleton event E = {s} being
realized. Here is an example of a rule that is not absurd and satisfies statewise dominance but not the
sure-thing principle. When the probability of death — or, more rigorously, of a lower level of utility
than a certain critical level — exceeds a threshold, the decision-maker seeks to minimize this probability.
Otherwise (and in case of ties for the over-threshold probability of death), he maximizes expected utility.
This rule satisfies statewise dominance because when an act weakly dominates another for all states of the
world, it has either a lower probability of death or an equal probability of death combined with a weakly
greater expected utility. The rule violates the sure-thing principle because knowing that an event E will
occur may raise the (conditional) probability of death above the threshold and reverse the preference
between two acts that coincide on S \E. That is, this rule may prefer the higher expected-utility act f to
the lower probability-of-death act g even though: i) it prefers g conditionally on E being realized, and
ii) it is indiﬀerent between f and g conditionally on E not being realized.
Another diﬀerence between statewise dominance and Savage’s theory is that, instead of introducing
conditional preferences directly, Savage chooses to formalize the sure-thing principle with his P2 axiom
which incorporates an additional separability requirement in order to simplify the expression of conditional
preferences.
P2: If f is weakly preferred to g, f(s) = f 0(s) for all s ∈ E, g(s) = g0(s) for all s ∈ E, f(s) = g(s) for all
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s /∈ E, f 0(s) = g0(s) for all s /∈ E, then f 0 is weakly preferred to g0.
This is a separability axiom implying that preference conditional on E being realized does not
depend on what happens if E is not realized. It makes it possible to derive conditional preference on E
unambiguously from preference over acts that coincide on S \E.
P2 implies the sure-thing principle by an iteration argument.21 The sure-thing principle, however,
does not require separability in itself. The maximin criterion is an example of a (not absurd) rule that
satisfies the sure-thing principle but not P2.22
Statewise dominance is also weaker than first-order stochastic dominance, since the latter additionally
incorporates the possibility to compare acts over diﬀerent states of the world (e.g., assuming that S =
{s, s0} and s and s0 are equiprobable, if f(s) is better than g(s0) while f(s0) is better than g(s), then
first-order stochastic dominance applies while statewise dominance may be silent).23
The non-expected utility theories failing to satisfy statewise dominance or first-order stochastic
dominance have been criticized (see, e.g., Handa 1977 and Fishburn 1978, or Kahneman and Tversky
21 If f is weakly preferred to g conditionally on E and conditionally on not E, under P2 this means that
f =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
f(s) for s ∈ E
f(s) for s /∈ E
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
is weakly preferred to
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
g(s) for s ∈ E
f(s) for s /∈ E
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
and ⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
g(s) for s ∈ E
f(s) for s /∈ E
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
is weakly preferred to
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
g(s) for s ∈ E
g(s) for s /∈ E
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
= g,
implying, by transitivity, that f is weakly preferred to g.
22The next axiom in Savage’s list relies on the notion of conditional preferences and requires consistency between global
and conditional preferences over the subset of constant acts:
P3: If f(s) = a for all s ∈ S, g(s) = b for all s ∈ S, and if preference conditional on E is not universal indiﬀerence, then f
is weakly preferred to g if and only if f is weakly preferred to g conditionally on E being realized.
An alternative formulation of P3, that does not incorporate P2, can be found in the literature. For instance, in Grant
(1995, p. 164) one finds:
P3* If f(s) = a for all s ∈ E, g(s) = b for all s ∈ E, f(s) = g(s) for all s /∈ E, f 0(s) = a for all s ∈ S, g0(s) = b for all
s ∈ S, and if preference on acts that coincide on S \E is not universal indiﬀerence, then f is weakly preferred to g if
and only if f 0 is weakly preferred to g0.
This axiom, in its “only if” part, contains a weaker separability requirement than P2, as analyzed by Grant in terms
of independence over lotteries. If one restricts P3* to its “if” part, it implies statewise dominance but not the sure-thing
principle.
23For instance, as explained in Quiggin (1989), regret theory violates first-order stochastic dominance but satisfies state-
wise dominance.
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1979, p. 284), and the more recent theories (e.g., Quiggin 1982, Machina 1982, Tversky and Kahneman
1992) do respect such dominance principles.24 Interestingly, Grant (1995) notes the violation of statewise
dominance in Diamond’s critique for social evaluation and considers that it can be used to question
statewise dominance in individual decision theory, invoking Machina’s (1989) example of a mother who
must give an indivisible “treat” to her daughter Abigail or her son Benjamin and seeks to be fair by the
use of a lottery. This example is indeed a direct adaptation of Diamond’s argument. We have assumed
in this paper that fairness considerations can justify the use of lotteries but not a violation of dominance.
There is an obvious diﬀerence between “giving the treat to Abigail, being unfair to Benjie” and “giving
it to Abigail after a fair lottery” which can be described in terms of ex-post consequences and does not
require such a strong violation of rationality.
24Note that, unlike the weak version, the strict version of statewise dominance (i.e., an act is strictly better if it strictly
dominates in all states of nature) is not even satisfied by Savage’s expected utility theory in some special contexts (finitely
additive probabilities–see Wakker 1993, p. 491).
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